Merchants, institutions and the market : changes in the salt trade in early colonial Bengal by Kanda, Sayako
 
 
 
Discussion Papers In Economics 
And Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN
 
Merchants, institutions and the market: 
changes in the salt trade in early colonial Bengal 
 
Sayako Kanda 
 
 
Discussion Paper 08-02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2008 
 
 
この研究は「大学院経済学研究科・経済学部記念事業」 
基金より援助を受けた、記して感謝する。 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN 
 
Merchants, institutions and the market: 
changes in the salt trade in early colonial Bengal 
 
Sayako Kanda 
 
 
Discussion Paper 08-02 
1 
 
 
Merchants, institutions and the market: 
changes in the salt trade in early colonial Bengal? 
 
 
Sayako Kanda† 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the transformation of the economy and society in early colonial Bengal, 
roughly between c.1780 and c.1840, through a case study of the salt trade and its changes. It 
argues that several private trade institutions, particularly various types of intermediaries at 
different stages of transactions and multi-caste elite organisations, enabled a large flow of 
commodities, cash, credit and information despite regional and functional divisions in the 
market as well as social divisions among merchants. 
     The coming of the British led to an expansion of the market and opened up various 
commercial opportunities to the socially inferior ‘amateur’ merchants, and this led to a 
confusion in mercantile communities and necessitated a new order among them. By 
strengthening the functions of those private trade institutions and utilising the new British 
legal system, mercantile communities managed to accommodate these new merchants and 
respond to the increased volume of trade. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper explores the transformation of the economy and society in Bengal during the 
period between c.1780 and c.1840— ‘a period of colonial transition’ in the history of South 
Asia, through a case study of the salt market, particularly focusing on the structural 
characteristics of the market, the features of various private trade institutions, and the changes 
in them. This period has been seen merely ‘transitional’ with no major economic or political 
changes, being stuck between the eras of dynamic changes—the eighteenth century and the 
high imperial era from the late nineteenth century onwards. Though it has recently attracted 
scholarly attention, empirical studies have just begun.1 This has made our understanding of 
India’s colonial transition too simple (and rather teleological), and has blurred the 
complicated process of transition and changes that occurred in the indigenous economy and 
society.  
    Recent studies have emphasised that the indigenous economy was resilient in many 
respects in the face of the British commercial and political expansion. But, as this study will 
show, fundamental changes were taking place in the meantime. Changes occurred not only by 
external forces or internal forces alone but also by repeated interactions between them. This 
paper stresses the importance of such complexity and interactions—the ways and processes 
that shaped the colonial economy and society. 
    In order to do so, this paper particularly examines the market, which has been ignored by 
recent historical studies, and will take up the following three issues. First, it will show that the 
market in eastern India was divided both structurally and regionally. Secondly, there were 
several kinds of trade institutions that enabled a massive flow of commodities, cash, credit 
and information. This paper particularly focuses on various types of intermediaries and 
multi-caste merchant organisations, which played a significant role in connecting merchants 
of various social origins and in acquiring credit at newly entered markets. Their presence was 
the reason why the divided market structure did not interfere with this region’s buoyant 
economy. Thirdly, the study will clarify that the advance of the English East India Company 
(hereafter the Company) rule led to an emergence of new merchants and an expansion of the 
market, which fuelled confusion in the existing mercantile society. The merchant society 
adjusted itself to this new situation by strengthening the role of intermediaries and merchant 
organisations, and by utilising the new legal framework and social order instituted by the 
British. 
                                            
1 For example, Modern Asian studies, 38-3 (2004) featured articles on this period. 
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    The significant role of private trade institutions and organisations in economic and 
historical change has long been studied. In the South Asian studies, Institutions and Economic 
Change in South Asia, edited by Burton Stein and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, generated scholarly 
attention in 1996. But after that, there has been little advance of historical studies that focuses 
on institutional aspects. This is partly because of the general decline of the field of economic 
history particularly on India, and partly because of the widening gap between economics and 
historical/social studies. This study attempts to fill this gap in order to enhance our 
understanding of the economic and historical transition. 
 
 
The Salt Market in Eastern India under the Company Raj 
 
The structure of the market 
The Company began to monopolise salt in 1772, and through a series of reforms during the 
1780s, it established a stable system of monopoly that produced large profits.2 Salt, hereupon, 
became the second largest revenue source for the Company, playing a crucial role in 
supporting the Company rule, and consequently in making the British India.  
    The market and trade in salt in eastern India were largely influenced by this change. The 
Company took the following five measures in order to control the supply of salt. First, it 
confined the production in certain districts along the Bay of Bengal, known as salt agencies. 
Secondly, it banned salt imports on private accounts, which shut out the import of north 
Indian varieties of salt—the most important item of import for the pre-British Bengal. Thirdly, 
it began to ‘import’ foreign salt mainly from Coromandel and Orissa instead.3 Fourthly, it 
prohibited the production of any other saline substances such as by-products of saltpetre 
within the monopoly area. Finally, various preventive measures were introduced to suppress 
illicit production and smuggling that was caused and stimulated by these changes. As a result, 
the market was rather converged in Bengal and Bihar; varieties of salt were restricted; and the 
strict control of supply and the high price of salt created a market for illicit salt, which became 
                                            
2 The high-price policy characterised the Company’s system of salt monopoly, in which the Company 
controlled the salt production and all the production was sold by public sales in Calcutta. This policy 
was maintained by the synergy of the Company and large salt purchasers; the Company controlled the 
supply while large purchasers bought up salt at public sales and kept up prices in the market. This 
system functioned well until 1836, and the monopoly itself lasted until 1863. For details, see Sayako 
Miki (Kanda), ‘Merchants, markets, and the monopoly of the East India Company: the salt trade in 
Bengal under colonial control’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 2005). 
3 Since foreign salt was ‘imported’ on the Company’s account as revenue, this trade was not included 
in the trade statistics. 
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an integral part of the salt market in eastern India.4 In spite of such changes in the market, the 
right to trade in salt was given exclusively to indigenous merchants. Study on the market 
under such governmental control and problems caused by such control will shed light on the 
actual working of the market.  
Salt was produced at six salt agencies (Hijili, Tamluk, Twenty-Four Parganas, Jessore, 
Bhulua and Chittagong), whence exported northwards to the interior (see Map). Almost all 
salt was brought to and stored in merchants’ warehouses at large salt entrepôts near the salt 
districts, before being distributed to nearby wholesale markets, bazaars (regular markets) and 
hats (periodic markets) in towns and villages, and distant wholesale markets. These salt 
entrepôts played a significant role in distributing salt, in adjusting the balance of 
supply-demand, and in controlling prices, which were the notable functions of wholesale 
markets in general.5 A series of detailed price data at major salt markets6 suggest that these 
entrepôts influenced prices in the neighbouring wholesale markets that depended on them for 
the supply of salt. Accordingly, the salt market was divided into several regional market 
zones centred on these entrepôts.7  
    As is shown in Table 1, a chain of several regional market zones formed larger 
inter-regional commercial zones.8 There were roughly four commercial zones in eastern 
India: western Bengal and Bihar; central Bengal; eastern Bengal; and Midnapur and 
westwards.9 In the western Bengal and Bihar zone, western Bengal salt (the produce of Hijili, 
Tamluk, and part of Twenty-Four Parganas agencies) and foreign salt were exported from the 
salt entrepôts along the Hugli to places in western and north-western Bengal, and Bihar. 
                                            
4 Miki (Kanda) ‘Merchants, markets, and the monopoly’; Sayako Kanda, ‘Energy in indigenous 
industries: Re-considering the decline of the salt industry in mid-nineteenth century Bengal’, Keio 
University market quality research project, discussion paper series DP2006-25 (February 2007). 
5 See C. A. Bayly, Rulers, townsmen and bazaars: north Indian society in the age of British 
expansion 1770-1860, Indian ed. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992) , pp.411-412; Rajat Datta, 
Society, economy and the market: commercialization in rural Bengal, c.1760-1800 (Delhi: Manohar, 
2000), pp.213-216. 
6 The Company was extremely keen to collect salt prices in principal markets, since price fluctuations 
would affect its salt revenues. It obtained prices systematically through the reports of district collectors 
and magistrates. 
7 For details, see, Miki (Kanda) ‘Merchants, markets, and the monopoly’, chapter 2. 
8 There were salt checkpoints known as chokis, along the boundaries of the salt agencies, where all 
salt cargoes and accompanied rowanas or transit passes, were to be examined. Each rowana specified 
the quantity of salt, the name of the agency, the destination, the name of the proprietor(s), and the date 
of purchase. A close examination of the lists of checked rowanas and the price data at major markets 
makes it possible to identify salt entrepôts, regional market zones, dominant merchant groups and 
larger inter-regional commercial zones, as is shown in Table 1. 
9 Regional difference in salt prices and the consumer preference, in addition to eastern India’s 
physical feature, supported such clear regional division of the market. For details, see Miki (Kanda) 
‘Merchants, markets, and the monopoly’, chapter 4. 
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Twenty-Four Parganas and Jessore salt was supplied to places in central and north Bengal 
mainly through Madhukhali and Sirajganj, which formed the central zone. In the eastern 
Bengal zone, eastern varieties (Bhulua and Chittagong) were distributed mainly through 
Narayanganj in markets in eastern and north-eastern Bengal. In the Midnapur and westwards 
zone, salt was exported to places inland in south Bihar to Chotanagpur, mainly through 
Kashiganj. 
    The Ganges and Brahmaputra River systems obviously played a major role in forming 
such commercial zones, as eastern India’s trade was particularly dependent on its 
sophisticated system of river transport. This determined what varieties of salt to circulate in 
each zone. But there was also a clear regional difference in the consumer preference in salt, 
and this suggests that the market for each variety should be determined not only by eastern 
India’s physical environment but also by its social and cultural diversity.10 Moreover, certain 
groups of merchants of different social origins dominated the trade in each zone; interestingly 
their territories and four commercial zones coincided with each other.11 
    Another important aspect of the market structure was that the trade was functionally 
divided between the inter-regional and local trade. The former involved large wholesale 
merchants in urban commercial centres and the transport of goods between wholesale markets 
(ganjs) on a large scale. The movement of commodities between wholesale and rural markets 
by miscellaneous small merchants, variously known as byaparis, paikars and farias, were 
categorised as local trade. Rather than being hierarchically structured, each trading process 
maintained its own structure, and together worked as one trading system, inter-linked by 
wholesale markets (see Diagram 1).12  
 
Private trade institutions and their functions 
As was seen in the previous section, the geographical division and the functional dualism 
were key structural features of the market, and different types of merchants operated in each 
commercial zone as well as in each trading process. Such divisions and differences did not, 
however, interfere with the province’s buoyant economy. Despite such divisions, certain trade 
institutions allowed a flow of commodities, cash, credit and information on a large scale, and 
                                            
10 For details on the consumer preference and taste, see Kanda, ‘Energy in indigenous industries’. 
11 For details on mercantile activities, see Sayako Kanda, ‘Family, caste and beyond: the management 
techniques of Bengal salt merchants, c.1780-1840’, the XIV International Economic History Congress, 
Helsinki, August 2006, http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers2/Kanda.pdf. 
12 For detailed discussion on the indigenous trading system, see Miki (Kanda) Sayako, ‘The English 
East India Company and indigenous trading systems: the grain trade in early colonial Bengal’, in S. 
Sugiyama and Linda Grove (eds), Commercial networks in modern Asia (London: Curzon Press 
2001); Miki (Kanda), ‘Merchants, markets, and the monopoly’, chapter 6. 
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linked merchants of various social backgrounds. Most significant was the existence of a range 
of intermediaries, especially gomastas and dalals, and merchants’ organisations, known as 
dals (or dalas).   
    Intermediaries played a crucial part in interlinking various merchants, who differed in 
caste, birthplace, business custom, and culture such as language, taste and appearance. A 
merchant was generally unable to engage in any commercial transactions outside his local 
market, because he was not seen as creditworthy and his family’s honour would not be 
protected at places outside his locality, which was seen ritually impure. In other words, in 
principle, credit of a merchant and his family would not circulate beyond his local community. 
Therefore, to extend his business to unknown places, a merchant would need to contact local 
intermediaries (contact men) first. By establishing such linkages, he would be able to conduct 
business in a new marketplace without damaging his family’s reputation. That was why 
intermediaries were usually men of credit and power in their respective territories. This 
honour system of family firms, together with the division of the market enhanced the position 
of intermediaries as sources of information and credit who provided merchants with security, 
and a way to connect with other people.13  
A gomasta was an agent of a merchant or a manager of a firm. A mercantile house was 
practically managed by several gomastas at its head office and branches. It is well known that 
gomastas were well acquainted with all matters regarding their masters’ business since they 
usually served the same family for generations, and that they even had more information of 
the state of the market in their charge than their masters as they resided on the spot.14 In past 
studies the gomasta had been seen just as a paid manager,15 but their long experience in 
business affairs, profound knowledge about a particular area, and the ability to deal with local 
merchants were indispensable to a firm.16 On the other hand, merchants with no gomasta in a 
                                            
13 There were local commercial languages and modes of trade, which outsiders were not able to 
understand. For example, in eastern Bengal, there was a peculiar language called tar between weavers 
and cloth merchants, and the practice, known as ‘arithmetic of the touch’, in which the parties 
communicated by touching each other’s hands under a cloth (James Taylor, A sketch of the 
topography and statistics of Dacca, Calcutta: G. H. Huttmann, Military Orphan Press, 1840, 
pp.267-268). 
14 BCSO-Salt, the West Bengal State Archives, vol.263 (4/12/1829), no.9. 
15 Gautam Bhadra described a gomasta as ‘a paid manager of the private trader’s concerns’, and 
claimed they had ‘hardly any share in the profit and loss of his employer’s business’ (Gautam Bhadra, 
‘The role of pykars in the silk industry of Bengal, c.1765-1830’, Part I, Studies in history, vol.3, no. 2, 
1987, pp.160-161). 
16 Their importance was also clearly shown in the management of estates of new zamindars 
(landholders). It was said that the estates with gomastas who were well acquainted with the area and 
people were usually well managed, which led to extended cultivation (B. B. Chaudhuri, ‘Agriculture 
growth in Bengal and Bihar, 1770-1860: growth of cultivation since the famine of 1770’, Bengal past 
and present, vol.95, 1976, p.319). 
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particular area had ‘hardly any just or accurate knowledge of the state of the market’,17 and 
were likely to be deceived by false information. 
    Dalals were usually denominated as commission agents or brokers. The dalal was 
‘essentially a contact man and information supplier’, and ‘received a commission on the 
transaction and as such no capital was necessary for his work’.18 The dalal played a crucial 
role in ‘introducing the parties to a bargain, setting a price, weighing or assessing the produce, 
verifying the payment, accepting it, and recording the deal’, even in a small market.19  
    A merchant usually found business partners from members of his own family or of the 
same caste. But these intermediaries were not restricted to the same caste as merchants. Many 
of them belonged to higher castes such as Brahmins and Kayasthas. Upper-caste 
intermediaries would make it much easier to deal with merchants of various social origins.  
    Another significant feature of the indigenous trade during this period was the multi-caste 
elite organisations, known as dals. According to S. N. Mukherjee, dals ‘were social factions, 
formed under the leadership of a rich man, a dalapati’.20 Dals dealt with all matters 
concerning caste rules. Importantly, ‘most dals were multi-caste bodies; Baidyas, Kayasthas, 
Tilis, Kaibartyas, Sadgops, Weavers, Subarnabaniks and Brahmins could belong to the same 
dal and the Brahmins in many dals accepted the leadership of other castes’.21 Some castes, 
like Subarnabaniks, had their own caste dal. Many new dals were formed in Calcutta in the 
latter half of the eighteenth century, as rich Hindus of different castes moved in. These 
families, who were large zamindars, merchants or top administrators, formed the 
bhadralok—an open social group of elites.22 Every bhadralok belonged to a dal, and 
influential bhadraloks among them set up dals and acted as dalapatis. 
    Mukherjee did not mention the influence of dals on their members’ trading activities. 
However, dals must have affected the business of their members, because the majority of the 
wealthy population in early nineteenth century Calcutta was associated with commercial or 
banking activities in one way or another. In Murshidabad, the dalapatis ‘managed the 
business in Murshidabad for the collective body’, and ‘regulated the activities of its members 
spread out over an extensive catchment area’.23 In these districts too, dals were multi-caste 
                                            
17 BRP-Salt, IOR, P/105/5 (21/11/1834), no.1B. 
18 Bhadra, ‘The role of pykars’, p.161. 
19  Peter Robb, ‘Peasants’ choices? Indian agriculture and the limits of commercialization in 
nineteenth-century Bihar’ Economic history review, vol.45, no.1, 1992, p.98. 
20 S. N. Mukherjee, ‘Class, caste and politics in Calcutta, 1815-38’, in Edmund Leach and S. N. 
Mukherjee (eds), Elites in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.71. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Mukherjee, ‘Class, caste and politics’, pp.47, 51-52, 56 and 71. 
23 Datta, Society, economy and the market, pp.211-212. 
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bodies; ‘other castes had to be incorporated in the wider network of the dalas’,24 including 
lower castes.  
    Therefore, it is safe to assume that dals were equivalent to multi-caste merchants’ 
organisations found in other parts of India.25 The main functions of such organisations were 
to guarantee members’ creditworthiness, to establish rules and regulations, to arbitrate in 
disputes, and to punish members who broke the rules. The loss of creditworthiness as a 
merchant indicated the loss of his family’s reputation, which could lead to a total ruin of the 
family, so it was necessary for the heads of mercantile families to take risk-avoiding 
behaviour and follow the rules of such organisations and the verdict of dalapatis. 
    The influence of dals and dalapatis was not limited to large towns such as Calcutta and 
Murshidabad. Most Calcutta dalapatis had followers in the rural areas, in their zamindaris 
and their ancestral villages.26 North Bengal merchants had regular meetings with their 
dalapatis in Murshidabad. Leading salt merchants of Dhaka, who dominated the eastern 
Bengal commercial zone, also acted as dalapatis. 27  It was highly likely that such 
organisations influenced the formation and division of commercial zones, as was seen earlier. 
 
 
Confusion and New Order in Mercantile Community 
 
Rise of new merchants 
Late eighteenth-century Bengal saw not only an emergence of Calcutta banians or 
compradors who served European traders but also a rise of up-country Bengali merchants 
who were based on up-country marketplaces and dealt in articles mainly for domestic 
consumption. A beneficial situation contributed to their rise. The Company’s policy-making 
during this period was based in ‘the principle of free trade’ and ‘the centralisation of 
tax-collection rights’. Particularly important was ‘a permanent settlement of marketplaces’, as 
Sudipta Sen called it.28 Through a series of administrative reforms in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, the Company state gradually secured control of marketplaces by 
                                            
24 Ibid. 
25 During the pre-British period, multi-caste merchants’ organisations were not uncommon in India. 
Among them were sabhas in the north and mahajans in the west. In Bengal, unlike other parts of India, 
there were few ‘professional’ or ‘traditional’ mercantile communities, known as Bania, so the 
formation of mercantile and elite communities seems to have been very different from other regions.  
26 Mukherjee, ‘Class, caste and politics’, p.71. 
27 For details of one of these merchants (the Baliati Babu family), see Kanda, ‘Family, caste and 
beyond’. 
28 Sudipta Sen, Empire of free trade: the East India Company and the making of the colonial 
marketplace, (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 1998), especially chapters 4 and 5. 
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making them ‘public property’, and deprived zamindars (landholders) and other old interests 
of privileges and authority over marketplaces. This process not only made it easier for the 
Company to obtain access to production sites, though through intermediaries (the Company 
gomastas), but also led to a proliferation of private marketplaces and enabled merchants ‘to 
expand their direct control over the internal market’.29  
    The establishment of the salt monopoly was another favourable chance for their 
emergence. Many merchants went into the salt trade, as exporters of salt to the market. 
Among the new up-country merchants, salt merchants attracted much attention by their 
success and wealth. 
    As will be examined in the following section, the Company’s salt monopoly brought 
about an emergence of large salt purchasers in Calcutta where all salt was to be auctioned.30 
Many of them were established merchants or bankers (shroffs) of Calcutta, belonging to 
Subarnabaniks, the long-established trading and banking community of Bengal; some 
belonged to higher castes such as Kayasthas and Brahmans. Since they bought up salt merely 
for speculative purposes and thus had little interest in the internal trade, up-country merchants 
began to play a crucial role in exporting salt to the market. Unlike Calcutta’s salt purchasers, 
many of them were rags-to-riches type of merchants, belonging to certain communities such 
as Tilis, Tamlis (Tambulis), Sadgops, Basaks and Sahas (or Sunris)31—Sahas and Tilis in 
particular.  Therefore, there was a wide social and commercial gap between the established 
elite merchants who belonged to the bhadralok and the new merchants.  
    Some of the up-country salt merchants, such as the Pal Chaudhuris of Ranaghat in Nadia 
District and the Nandis of Kalna in Burdwan District, had moved to Calcutta and settled 
there.32 Since they were not only principal salt purchasers at public sales like the established 
                                            
29 Datta, Society, economy and the market, pp.200-206. 
30 Almost all large salt merchants were Bengali Hindus, except for the Greeks. 
31  According to the original occupational category, it is said that Tamlis were betel-leaf 
preparer-cum-dealers; Sadgops were cultivators; Basaks were cloth merchants—the sub-caste of 
Tantis (weavers); Sahas were the sub-caste of Sunris (distiller-cum-liquor dealers). The traditional 
occupation of Tilis had been rather controversial. Some say that they were a sub-caste of the 
oil-pressers (Telis), but others say that they were a traditional trading community (S. C. Nandy, Life 
and times of Cantoo Baboo, Krishna Kanta Nandy: the banian of Warren Hastings, vol.1, Bombay: 
Allied Publishers, 1978, pp.23-24). Also see, James Wise, Notes on the races, castes, and tribes of 
eastern Bengal (London: Harrison & sons, 1883), pp.389-391. These several caste groups had given 
up their traditional occupations and formed broader trading communities. According to Hitesranjan 
Sanyal, the continuous formation of sub-castes generated social mobility in Bengal (Sanyal, Social 
mobility in Bengal, Calcutta: Papyrus, 1981). When certain sections of a community took advantage of 
new opportunities such as technological improvement or specialisation within their traditional 
occupations, they formed new sub-castes.  
32 For details on Bengali family firms including these families, see Kanda, ‘Family, caste and beyond’, 
in which their family trees and management techniques are re-constructed by collecting and examining 
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merchants in Calcutta but also large exporters to the market, a small number of such families 
of up-country origin came to dominate the market across eastern India. These families became 
extremely wealthy and extended their business operations beyond salt to landholding, 
money-lending and dealing in other commodities. These new rich merchants, who were 
socially inferior, became be recognised as the bhadralok.  
    How and when was the social and commercial gap between the established and the new 
merchants filled? Changes in the composition of participants of petitions to the government 
indicate the social status of new salt merchants and their relationships with the existing 
mercantile community over the period. Until the mid-1820s, there were two types of petitions 
in terms of social status of the participants: those led by speculative purchasers and by ‘real’ 
merchants. The former organised petitions of their own rather than joining new merchants 
such as the Pal Chaudhuris. Differences in commercial interests between these two groups 
characterised this division; the former looked only at the state of the Calcutta market, while 
the latter were interested in the market both in the interior and in Calcutta.  
    From the mid-1820s, Calcutta experienced successive financial crises. Since many salt 
purchasers traded in salt papers (chars), on which merchants took out a loan from indigenous 
bankers or British banks, large salt merchants were easily caught up in the fluctuations in the 
financial market.33 This series of financial crises produced many defaulters and bankrupts. 
Frauds were widespread among large merchants; some of them were even arrested by the 
police. In the early 1830s, there was still a great deal of uncertainty among Calcutta 
merchants, and the economic prospect was still poor.  
    Repeated petitions from the late 1820s involved many large salt purchasers of different 
social origins. This suggests that the widespread confusion and uncertainty among merchants 
facilitated the unification of large Calcutta purchasers as a collective body, in order to protect 
their common commercial and social interests. Around that time, large salt purchasers began 
to be collectively known as the dhuratias (the privileged). This meant that some of the new 
salt merchants successfully joined the elite community in Calcutta by that time; some of them, 
such as the Pal Chaudhuris, were even seen as abhijats (aristocrats)—the highest social status 
in the indigenous community.34  
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
court papers preserved in the Calcutta High Court as well as various official documents (the Company 
papers). 
33 The vulnerability of the monopoly system and the impact of financial crises on salt purchasers are 
discussed in detail in Miki (Kanda), ‘Merchants, markets, and the monopoly’, chapters 3 and 4. 
34 Mukherjee, ‘Class, caste and politics’, pp.46-47. 
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Changes in trade institutions 
This section looks at the background factors that entangled the confusion and brought about a 
new order among merchants. First, the function of intermediaries became intensified. 
Secondly, the dals played a leading role in mitigating credit uncertainty among merchants by 
embracing a variety of merchants in the established community. Thirdly, Brahmans acquired 
much greater importance as intermediaries and as dalapatis (the heads of dals).  
    Under the public auction system, the Calcutta-centred salt trading system emerged. This 
was because up-country merchants had to attend the sales in Calcutta, to send their gomastas 
(agents) to the sales, or to meet first purchasers through dalals (brokers) in order to buy salt, 
to pay for it and to obtain necessary documents (chars and rowanas) to receive and transport 
it. When the sale by public auction began in 1788, rich men in Calcutta entered the salt 
business as dalals of up-country merchants, since they were familiar with the business custom 
and the mode of transactions in Calcutta. This kind of agency system was particularly 
common among merchants in western Bengal and Bihar, which area was equivalent of the 
western Bengal and Bihar commercial zone. Merchants in these regions were socially and 
culturally more diverse. In addition, the role of dalals became more important as an 
intermediate between anonymous buyers and sellers, when the trade in salt papers (chars) for 
speculative purposes in the Calcutta market became popular during the first decade of the 
nineteenth century. British banks also began to accept salt chars as security for loan, which 
became their main branch of business. 
    At wholesale markets in the interior too, merchants sold salt at their warehouses to other 
wholesale merchants and smaller merchants (byaparis, paikars and farias) through their 
gomastas and dalals who brought various merchants together. It was crucial for marketing 
strategies of wholesale merchants to utilise the local information and commercial networks of 
smaller merchants, through their gomastas and dalals. 35  Though it was strategically 
important to establish warehouses at major entrepôts, this was not sufficient to be a trader at 
these markets. It was crucial to establish personal networks and linkages with local 
intermediaries, who guaranteed merchants’ creditworthiness. 
    The case of the salt trade suggests that the expansion of the market and the growth of 
trade demanded intermediaries, and inevitably their importance increased. 
    How did merchants who shared common interests come together? When their common 
interests were threatened, merchants united and expressed their dissatisfaction. The 
government tended to see caste linkages as an important reason for enabling merchants ‘to 
                                            
35 For details, see, Miki (Kanda), ‘Merchants, markets, and the monopoly’, pp.269-275.  
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form combinations against the public with greater facility than in other countries’.36 Caste 
certainly played a role in interlinking merchants, but there were many cases where merchants 
‘combined’ across social and regional boundaries. 
    It had always been said that there was a ‘sub-monopoly’ by ‘combinations’ among large 
salt purchasers. Petitions led by Calcutta’s privileged purchasers (the dhuratias) in the early 
1830s were regarded as ‘combinations’ against the public interest. However, H. M. Parker, 
the junior member of the Board of Customs, Salt and Opium, was of the opinion that ‘there is 
no general organised system of submonopoly strictly speaking’,37 and ‘submonopoly is 
hardly a correct word. It is rather an understanding a feeling of common interest which unites 
the Dhuratea [privileged] merchants in some cases, though even in those very loosely’.38  
    But there was an exception; merchants ‘combined’ at the time of re-sale of defaulters’ 
salt, since having the salt re-sold was regarded as extremely humiliating and shameful, 
especially for respectable men.39 They always tried ‘to make all re-sales in short as difficult 
and disagreeable to this office as they possibly can’.40 As Ramratan Mallik, one of the most 
influential merchants in Calcutta said, being a defaulter was highly injurious to ‘a merchant of 
wealth, opulence and credit’, and would ‘affect his credit within the mercantile community in 
Calcutta’.41 This clearly suggests the importance of reputation, without which a man could 
not be a merchant. 
    The dals and dalapatis always brought merchants or different castes together, and 
facilitated a circulation of members’ credit in the market during this period. A merchant who 
lost credit due to a failure would be punished by the dal or in the worst case would be 
expelled from it. Therefore, the dals seem to have been behind such ‘combinations’, and tried 
to save fellow members. 
    As said, the majority of intermediaries and dalapatis were Brahmans by caste. Whenever 
salt belonging to a Brahman was to be re-sold, the sale became a disaster. According to the 
government, ‘a Bramin, besides resorting to the customary modes of exciting the sympathy 
and procuring the support of the other dealers, used those means which a Bramin alone can 
employ to deter them from breaking him down’.42 Many Brahmans were involved in the salt 
business during the period. They were at first acting just as dalals (brokers), since ‘although 
                                            
36 Datta, Society, economy and the market, p.234. 
37 BRP-Salt, IOR, P/105/17 (1/12/1835), no.24. 
38 BRP-Salt, IOR, P/105/20 (2/1/1836), no.16. 
39 BRP-Salt, IOR, P/105/17 (1/12/1835), no.24. When purchasers failed to pay for their purchases 
within a certain period of time, their salt was re-sold by the Company. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ramruttun Mullick v. East India Company, SCP (equity), 1818. 
42 BRP-Salt, IOR, P/105/17 (1/12/1835), no.24. 
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the Shasters [Shastras] prohibit trading in salt to a Brahman, that prohibition … is not 
considered to extend to agents between the buyers and the sellers to the article’.43 The 
government saw the dalals, who were mainly Brahmans, as one of the chief impediments to 
the operation of salt sales. Brahman dalals were able to bring the up-country merchants into 
the ‘combination’ of large purchasers of Calcutta. More information thus went to the hands of 
Brahman dalals, who were concurrently dalapatis in many cases. 
 
External forces of change 
The mercantile communities adjusted themselves to the new economic and social 
environment by making the most of their existing trade institutions and social relationships. 
At the same time, institutional changes outside mercantile communities began to affect them.  
   First, the so-called ‘caste society’ emerged under the British.44 Though controversial, the 
‘caste society’ was a hierarchical society with Brahmans on the top according to the Laws of 
Manu, and was divided into numerous ‘castes’, which was translated as classes. This change 
raised the social and ritual status of high caste intermediaries even further. As was seen earlier, 
merchants of socially inferior depended more on Brahman dalals and gomastas not only for 
business purposes but also for the enhancement of their social status within the indigenous 
community, which enabled them to enter dals and secured their creditworthiness.  
    Secondly, as the Company was in the process of materialising ‘the rule by law’, a new 
judicial system was established in Bengal in 1793.45 From the late eighteenth century, the 
Company developed the common law by integrating various religious customary laws and 
interpreting customs and common practices. Adjudications by private judges like dalapatis 
were examined and gradually integrated into official law. At the same time, through extensive 
projects of discovering and examining the Shastric [Hindu] texts and other indigenous legal 
codes, ‘the Hindu law’ was codified and formed. In civil cases, the Hindu law was applied to 
Hindus, and the Islamic law was applied to Muslims. When the existing laws did not cover a 
situation, equity was to be applied. 
    In Calcutta, many merchants began to compete with each other to go to court in order to 
solve various matters including debts, contracts, joint venture, caste issues, and inheritance, 
though arbitration by the court was not popular outside Calcutta until the mid-nineteenth 
century. Many families spent huge sums on litigation, as did the Pal Chaudhuris and other salt 
                                            
43 BRP-Salt, IOR, P/105/26 (19/7/1836), no.8. 
44 For example, see Susan Bayly, Caste, society and politics in India from the eighteenth century to 
modern age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chapter 1. 
45  Fujii Takeshi, Rekishi no naka no kāsuto—kindai indo no <jigazō> [ Caste in history—a 
self-portrait of modern India] (Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten, 2003). 
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merchants. According to Samachar Darpan, a Bengali newspaper, ‘for the Zemindars lawsuit 
in the Supreme Court was esteemed a token of respectability and when to say that a man had 
two or three cases in equity gave him as great distinction as to say that he had spent [Rs.] 
20,000 at the Doorga Pooja’.46 Many rich men in Calcutta, thus, went to court to display their 
prominence. This situation encouraged particularly nouveaux riches like the new salt 
merchants. 
    Why did Calcutta elites become so dependent on the new British legal system? It appears 
that ‘the customary law’ and ‘the arbitration by a respectable merchant according to the 
tradition of merchants’, which was one of the main roles of dalapatis, were no longer working 
effectively in Calcutta. A rapid growth of the bhadralok and diversification of its members’ 
social backgrounds had gone beyond dalapatis’ control in Calcutta.47 Even though many 
cases were judged in accordance with equity as common law and the so-called ‘Hindu law’ 
were still in the process of being prepared, official judges gradually filled in for dalapatis.   
    In addition, the new legal system was more protective of properties than communal 
arbitration, so it was highly likely that it became more attractive for merchants whose first 
priority (dharma) was to protect their family’s honour and physical continuance. Especially 
when the fear of failure prevailed among merchants of credit in the late 1820s and early 1830s, 
many of them became more dependent on the court in order to avoid default. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
By intensifying existent trade institutions, the confusion in mercantile communities caused by 
the rise of miscellaneous ‘amateur’ merchants was unsnarled, hence did not interfere with the 
expansion of the market stimulated by the advance of the Company rule. First, the function of 
intermediaries was strengthened. Credit and information from the intermediaries successfully 
met the demand of new merchants, and supported the expansion of their commercial networks. 
More information seems to have come into their hands. Moreover, since the majority of new 
merchants were socially inferior, intermediaries of higher castes played a crucial role in 
interlinking various buyers and sellers. Secondly, dals incorporated newly emerged merchants 
                                            
46 Cited from Chattopadhyay, ‘Police tax and traders’ protest in Bengal 1793-1798’, in Basudeb 
Chattopadhyay, Hari S. Vasudevan, and Rajat Kanta Ray (eds), Dissent and consensus: protest in 
pre-industrial societies, India, Burma and Russia (Calcutta: K P Bagchi, 1989), p.31. Durga Puja is 
the biggest festival in Bengal held in autumn for worshipping the goddess Durga. 
47 In the rest of the province, codified legal systems were not yet in effect and ‘traditional’ arbitration 
was much highly regarded as a trustworthy method (Bayly, Rulers, townsmen and bazaars, 
pp.420-421). 
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through high-caste dalals, which further diversified members’ castes. By doing so, the 
established mercantile communities restored order, while new merchants gained access to 
credit outside their local community, and both of them successfully avoided their reputation 
from being harmed. External changes—the emergence of ‘the caste society’ and the 
introduction of the new legal system—also influenced private institutions and governance. 
    It is well known that from the mid-nineteenth century, particular mercantile or banking 
communities such as the Marwaris, the Parsis and the Chettiyars emerged, based on bazaars 
in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. These communities took advantage of the new 
transportation and communication networks under the British, expanded their commercial and 
banking networks beyond South Asia, and finally spearheaded India’s industrialisation to this 
day. Though the British occupied the ‘organised sector’ of the economy, their emergence has 
been regarded as the symbol of resilience and dynamism of the indigenous economy under 
colonial control. Even so, the findings of this study strongly suggest that the colonial 
transition was not as simple as previous studies have claimed, since changes in the economy 
at the regional level had gone through more complicated processes. 
    Nevertheless, from the mid-nineteenth century on, the homogenous communities rather 
than multi-caste or heterogeneous ones obviously responded successfully to changes and 
further expansion of the market. The role of intermediaries became even stronger. But 
merchants had become more dependent on intermediaries from their own communities rather 
than from different castes. This was partly because the emergence of ‘the caste society’ 
gradually drove away Brahmans from any commercial activities, as ‘the Hindu law’ was 
gradually being enforced. Brahmans lost their information advantage and no longer 
functioned as the centre of information networks. Moreover, since private law was based on 
personal law, the ties among the same caste members became strengthened across regional 
boundaries. This certainly encouraged horizontal ties—caste-based networks over much wider 
geographical area. 
    As the new judicial system prevailed, the system of local communal arbitration began to 
lose its effectiveness throughout the British territories. In Calcutta, dals, which were once so 
powerful in the society, had completely disappeared by 1870. But this did not mean that the 
state took over all the functions of private institutions. Caste provided its members with credit, 
information that had been accumulated within the community, personal networks and other 
necessary facilities. Intermediaries still played a central role in caste-based commercial 
networks. Meanwhile, caste councils (panchayats) worked as a private or communal court, 
and influenced members’ personal and ritual matters. Since honour or reputation was integral 
part of a firm, caste rules were influential to members’ commercial activities. 
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Table 1: Commercial Zones in Eastern India 
 
 
Commercial 
Zones 
Major 
Varieties of 
Salt 
Major 
Distribution 
Markets 
Business Bases of 
Major Wholesale 
Merchants 
Major ‘Castes’ 
of Merchants 
Western 
Bengal 
& 
Bihar 
Hijili; 
Tamluk; 
24-Parganas; 
Foreign  
Ghatal; Amta; 
Ghirihati; Kalna; 
Katwa; Sutanuti 
(Calcutta); Patna; 
Salkhia (Market 
for foreign salt) 
Calcutta (Hatkhola, 
Chitpur); Kalna; 
Katwa; 
Marketplaces along 
the Hugli 
Bengali: 
Tili 
Sadgop 
Tambli, etc. 
Bihari: 
  Kalwar, etc. 
Central 
Bengal 
24-Parganas; 
Jessore; 
Bhulua  
Madhukhali; 
Sirajganj 
Faridpur District; 
Tallyganj (south 
Calcutta) 
Tili 
Saha 
Eastern 
Bengal 
Bhulua; 
Chittagong; 
Jessore 
Narayanganj; 
Nalchiti 
Narayanganj; 
Dhaka & Faridpur 
Districts 
Saha 
Tili 
(Greek) 
Midnapur & 
Westward 
Hijili; 
Tamluk 
Kashiganj Kashiganj; 
Midnapur District 
Tili? 
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Diagram 1: Personal Networks in the Indigenous Trading System 
 
 
    ?    Inter-Regional Trade                     Local Trade 
 Wholesale Markets 
      (ganjs) 
 
      
  Paikars; farias; byaparis 
Wholesale 
Merchants  Gomastas 
  Dalals 
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Glossary 
 
Abhijat An aristocrat 
Bazaar A fixed market 
Bhadralok A gentleman or the gentry  
Byapari A merchant 
Char (Chhar) A delivery order 
Choki (Chokey) A toll or customs station 
Dal (Dala) A social faction among the upper classes in large 
towns 
Dalal A broker 
Dalapati A head of a dal 
Dhuratia A proprietor or a large salt purchaser at public sales 
Faria (Pharia) An itinerant merchant 
Ganj A wholesale fixed market 
Gomasta An agent or a manager in a firm 
Gola A warehouse 
Hat A periodic market 
Hundi A bill of exchange 
Paikar An itinerant merchant, small wholesale trader 
Rowana  A pass or a permit 
Shroff A money-changer or a banker 
Zamindar A landholder 
Zamindari The estate or tenure of a zamindar 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
BCSO-Salt Bengal Board of Customs, Salt and Opium Proceedings—Salt 
BRC-Salt Bengal Revenue Consultations (Salt, Opium and c.)—Salt 
BRP-Salt Bengal Board of Revenue (Miscellaneous) Proceedings—Salt 
IOR India Office Records, British Library 
SCP Supreme Court Papers, Calcutta High Court 
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